To: General Trent, CinC US Forces Okinawa
From: Brigadier General Spelthorne, 2nd Brigade 4th Division US Army
Sir,
I submit for your review my report on the actions of my forces in the Hira Falls Valley on the 9th of July, 1908. Our orders were to advance into the valley and destroy an identified enemy munitions cache in the village of Mihara and an enemy armaments factory. Our advance to the valley began at 0800 from the landing grounds, taking two hours for our forces to begin arriving.
2nd Volunteer Cavalry Regiment were the first unit to deploy, entering the valley at 1000, ordered to move east of the road into the valley to investigate tracks reported by scouts. 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 2nd Brigade (Infantry) continued their advance up the road, followed by the 2nd Field Gun Battery and 3rd Cavalry Regiment ordered to provide flank protection.
By 1015, our infantry units were approximately halfway between the entrance of the valley and the dried up riverbed, approximately 750 yards from the riverbed. 2nd Vol. Cavalry should have reached the tracks on the far side of the riverbed. In expectation of soon being able to sight Mihara village, I ordered the 2nd Field Gun Battery to move west of the road until line of sight could be established. To ensure the security of 2nd Field Gun Battery, orders were send to the 2nd Battalion to establish defensive positions to protect the guns.
At 1030, a runner from 1st Battalion reached the Brigade HQ, reporting encountering an expected fork in the road to Mihara and requesting instructions. A runner from 2nd Battalion also arrived shortly after, reporting the same fork. Orders were sent for 1st Battalion to advance along the left fork in the road, and to 3rd Cavalry to advance along the right fork.
At 1040 an order was sent to 2nd Cavalry to send a Squadron with Colonel Jackson III to investigate the reported tracks, while sending the other two Squadrons in the Regiment to advance on the factory.
At 1050, a runner from 1st Battalion reported they had engaged the enemy. In response to this, I ordered 2nd Battalion to advance north in a defensive triangle formation to support 1st Battalion. Shortly after receiving those orders, 2nd Battalion reported coming under effective fire from the enemy. It was clear at this point that 1st Battalion was not in the position expected. Lieutenant Werner, who had been sent with orders for 1st Battalion along the left fork, did not return to our lines, and has not been seen since the engagement, and is presumed captured or killed.
The firefight between 2nd Battalion and the enemy continued for approximately 15 minutes. With losses mounting, and 2nd Field Gun Battery being unable to sight the village of Mihara, I directed them to provide supporting fire on the enemy engaging 2nd Battalion. They ranged in good time and were soon firing for effect. Fire onto 2nd Battalion slackened noticeably after the artillery began firing. Enemy artillery ranging shots started to land around 2nd Battalion.
The lack of contact with 1st Battalion and 3rd Cavalry Regiment was of significant concern at this point. A further order was sent to 3rd Cavalry at 1120 to move west to support 2nd Battalion. At 1125, an officer was dispatched to locate and get a report from 2nd Volunteer Cavalry in an attempt to gain a greater understanding of the current situation.
At 1130, we sighted forces on the large hill east of 2nd Battalion, which were presumed to be 3rd Cavalry. The enemy's artillery ceased firing around this time, having ranged in on 2nd Battalion but managed to being a barrage. It was surmised that either 2nd Volunteer Cavalry or 1st Battalion had threatened or silenced the guns.
At 1135, 3rd Cavalry deployed south of the riverbed, dismounted and took up a defensive posture. A runner from 2nd Battalion also arrived, conveying their unwillingness and inability to withdraw despite the enemy presence and coming under machine gun fire. 3rd Cavalry was ordered to advance, locate the machine guns and silence them. A report was received from 2nd Volunteer Cavalry, reporting the destruction of the factory and that they were preparing to engage enemy forces and would be unable to detach squadrons to investigate the tracks.
At 1140, an officer was sent to identify the forces on the large hill east of 2nd Battalion who appeared to be moving south in a defensive manner, maintaining a watch to the north. 2nd Battalion, despite their early refusal to do so, now was forced to withdraw, with heavy losses, across the riverbed and behind 3rd Cavalry.
At 1150, a group of cavalry, at the time believed to be 3rd Cavalry, but later identified as 2nd Volunteer Cavalry, were sighted at the fork in the road, engaged in combat with Japanese cavalry, whom they soon put to flight. The cavalry attempted to follow up, but were engaged by machine guns and forced to withdraw.
At 1155, 1st Battalion managed to get a runner to headquarters, reporting they had destroyed the village of Mihara. With no enemy forces engaging ours at the time, and having taken significant losses, with our objectives achieved, I ordered a general withdrawal, which was completed without further loss.
In summary, our forces destroyed the village of Mihara, and any supplies contained within, and the munitions factory, destroying one enemy cavalry regiment and inflicting heavy losses on at least two infantry battalions. It is also possible that the enemy artillery was caught in the barrage fired and was either destroyed or forced to withdraw. Enemy losses are unknown, but assumed to be heavy. No prisoners were taken.
Our losses amounted to approximately 950 men killed, wounded or missing, plus approximately 200 horses. No heavy equipment was lost. Our forces returned to friendly lines and are reorganizing. I anticipate all units will be combat ready within 12 hours, although 2nd Volunteer Cavalry has taken heavy losses in both men and horses and will be unable to field more than 2 Squadrons. 2nd Battalion has been reduced to an effective strength of three companies, all slightly under-strength.
I trust you find the results of our operation and this report meets your standards.
Brig. Gen. Spelthorne
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